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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Making the Business Case for Process Safety Using Value-at-Risk 
 
Concepts.  (August 2006) 
 
Jayming Sha Fang, B.S., The University of Texas at Austin 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:   Dr. David M. Ford 
 
 
An increasing emphasis on chemical process safety over the last two decades has 
led to the development and application of powerful risk assessment tools.  Hazard 
analysis and risk evaluation techniques have developed to the point where quantitatively 
meaningful risks can be calculated for processes and plants.  However, the results are 
typically presented in semi-quantitative “ranked list” or “categorical matrix” formats, 
which are certainly useful but not optimal for making business decisions.  A relatively 
new technique for performing valuation under uncertainty, Value at Risk (VaR), has 
been developed in the financial world.  VaR is a method of evaluating the probability of 
a gain or loss by a complex venture, by examining the stochastic behavior of its 
components. We believe that combining quantitative risk assessment techniques with 
VaR concepts will bridge the gap between engineers and scientists who determine 
process risk and business leaders and policy makers who evaluate, manage, or regulate 
risk.  We present a few basic examples of the application of VaR to hazard analysis in 
the chemical process industry.  We discover that by using the VaR tool we are able to 
present data that allows management to make better informed decisions. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Due to the inherent sensitivity of the chemical process industry (CPI) to the 
consequences of failure, chemical process safety has been a major concern for some time 
(AICHE, 1989).  In the current era of market mechanisms and efficiency, the underlying 
driving force is to make production as cheap as possible, to save investment money 
where possible, and to avoid overdoing measures that just serve to safeguard.  History, 
however, reveals that safety does pay in the long run. (Pasman, 2000) Chemical process 
quantitative risk assessment (CPQRA) identifies areas in operations, engineering, and 
management systems that might be modified to reduce process risk.  CPQRA deals with 
both aspects of risk, namely likelihood and consequence.  Likelihood is typically 
estimated through some combination of historical data and fault/event tree analysis.  
Consequence modeling generally consists of two parts; detailed science models predict 
the parameters of incident-specific events (e.g. gas release, explosion overpressure), and 
effect/mitigation models predict the final consequences on people and the environment 
(natural and built).  The product of likelihood and consequence is a measure of risk.   
 
 
 
____________________ 
This thesis conforms to the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 
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Presently, CPQRA has developed to the point where quantitatively meaningful risks 
may be calculated for individual processes and entire plants.  (Fang et al., 2004)1
Obviously, implementing safety devices and procedures to remove all risks in a 
chemical plant is not feasible.  Thus, an important part of a CPQRA analysis is 
prioritizing the risks for appropriate action.  The results are typically reported in a 
likelihood-consequence matrix format, or perhaps in a ranked list.  While this semi-
quantitative approach is useful, we believe that CPQRA has progressed to a point where 
the results may be presented in more detail and with more quantitative precision.  
Furthermore, they should be presented in a comprehensive format that is useful to CPI 
management and other policy makers.  This is not an easy task, primarily due to the 
inherently probabilistic nature of the problem.  However, the rewards of such an 
approach would be substantial; a more quantitative and coherent business case for 
process safety would certainly result in a better-focused investment by the CPI. (Fang et 
al., 2004) 
In this thesis, we present a new approach for understanding, organizing, and 
packaging the results of CPQRA analyses.  The approach is based on a technique, Value 
at Risk (VaR), borrowed from the financial industry (Jorion, 2001); it will provide a 
bridge between the engineers and scientists who calculate process risk and the business 
leaders and policy makers who evaluate, manage, or regulate risk in a broader context.  
VaR is a method of evaluating the probability of a gain or loss by a complex venture, by 
                                                 
1 Reprinted with permission from “Making the business case for process safety using value-at-risk 
concepts” Fang, J.S., Ford, D.F., & Mannan, M.S, 2004. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 115, 17-26.  
2004 by Elsevier.  
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examining the stochastic behavior of its components.  The framework is firmly grounded 
in the theory of VaR, yet flexible enough so that it may be: 
• used at several different organizational levels (process, plant, industry 
segment). 
• integrated with other business risk concerns (operational, market) so 
that complete and accurate cost-benefit decisions may be made. 
• implemented in software targeted for industrial risk professionals. 
• extended to other types of risk (environmental, societal) and for use by 
other stakeholders (governmental agencies, public interest groups). 
(Fang et al., 2000) 
The primary focus of this thesis is to introduce the approach and demonstrate its use 
on case problems from the literature.  We note that VaR concepts have begun to appear 
in other areas of process design research.  For example, Barbaro and Bagajewicz (in 
press) have employed VaR in developing a two-stage stochastic formulation for 
managing financial risk in planning under uncertainty.   
In addition to the CPQRA analyses, we investigate the Layers of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA) to VaR analysis. LOPA defines a series of independent layers of defense against 
harmful events and their consequences.  This represents an increase in complexity 
because this allows us to investigate the impact of individual safety devices (i.e. 
interlocks, alarms) on the inherent safety of the component and how removing or placing 
a safety device can affect the safety.  However, as before, the VaR is still represented as 
one curve.  (Fang et al., 2004) 
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1.2.  Organization 
Chapter II contains the theoretical development for combining VaR and CPQRA.  
Chapter III demonstrates the procedure on two different example problems using the 
basic concepts.  Chapter IV demonstrates a more advanced case study using dollars and 
process known as the Layers of Protection Analysis technique.  The first example is 
based on a single event tree and a simple damage valuation index, with various layers of 
probabilistic complexity sequentially added in.  The second is closer to a real-world 
example, using a hazard quantification index from the literature.  And the third is the 
closest to simulating a real world problem that uses valuation in terms of dollars and 
uses several event trees, consisting of independent layers of protection.  Chapter V 
concludes this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1.  Value at Risk 
VaR is a method of evaluating the probability of a gain or loss by a complex 
financial venture, by examining the stochastic behavior of its components (Jorion, 2001).  
VaR approaches generally involve a combination of likelihood estimation and valuation: 
how likely is an event to happen, and what is the financial impact on the portfolio?  
Quantification of both of these aspects may involve sophisticated probabilistic analyses.  
A major strength of the VaR technique is that it provides a total cost-benefit analysis of 
an entire portfolio in terms of a single probability distribution function for value.  VaR 
itself is technically defined as the worst loss that is expected in a portfolio, within a 
given probability, over a specified time period. (Fang et al., 2004) 
The flexibility of the VaR approach (i.e., the ability to accept input from different 
events), combined with the comprehensive, straightforward presentation of results (i.e., 
the use of a single probabilistic value function), makes it attractive for application to 
problems in CPQRA.  
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2.2.  Integration of CPQRA and VaR  
The diagram in Figure 1 shows how we envision the procedure.  Traditional CPQRA 
tools are used to determine the probabilities and consequences of undesired events 
associated with a plant or process.  The consequences are passed to a valuation model, 
where they are assigned values (or distributions of values).  The valuation may be done 
in monetary terms, or with a customized index appropriate to the particular situation or 
stakeholders. For undesired events, the values will typically be negative by convention.  
The results of the CPQRA and valuation are sent to the VaR engine, where they are 
combined to generate a single VaR probability distribution function representing 
process/plant value.  (Fang et al., 2004) 
The VaR approach is capable of handling complex situations in which the 
fundamental stochastic events are related in a nonlinear fashion within the portfolio; this 
level of complexity typically requires simulation using Monte Carlo techniques (Jorion, 
2001)  This level of treatment is not required for the simple example situations described 
below, but it might be for many real-world problems in the CPI. 
We also note that the cumulative versions of our VaR probability curves are 
somewhat analogous to the frequency-number, or F-N, curves often used to describe 
societal risk (AICHE, 1989).  F-N curves show the cumulative frequency of undesired 
events with respect to the number of individuals affected (e.g. killed, injured, exposed).  
Our cumulative VaR curves represent the cumulative frequency of experiencing a loss 
with respect to the damage value.  In this thesis, we consider damage value in an abstract 
sense and do not relate it to human life. 
 7
 
 
CPQRA 
 
HAZOP, FMEA, LOPA 
Fault/event trees 
Consequence models 
 
Valuation 
 
Natural & built environment 
Personal injuries 
Index or monetary scale 
VaR 
engine
VaR probability-value curve
Figure 1.  Flow chart of the integration of VaR and CPQRA  
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CHAPTER III 
APPLICATION EXAMPLES 
 
3.1.  First Example Problem: Leak from LPG Storage Tank 
This example problem applies a VaR analysis to a problem illustrated in Chapter 3 of 
the CPQRA.  The possible events and outcomes, and their frequencies, are taken directly 
from that example.  We created the damage index described below, specifically for 
illustrative purposes related to this example.  The values of the damage index for the 
different possible outcomes were assigned based on our judgment. 
 
3.1.1.  Scenario description 
In this example, we assume that a fault tree analysis has identified the potential 
problem of a large leakage from an isolated LPG storage tank and estimated the 
frequency with which this problem is expected to occur.  A further event tree analysis, as 
shown in Figure 1 yields 10 possible scenarios comprised of six distinct outcomes.  The 
six outcomes and their associated frequencies are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1  Data for the LPG leak problem 
Incident Damage 
Index 
Uncertainty Frequency (10-
6/yr) 
BLEVE -200 25 2 
Flash fire -150 15 32.4 
Flash Fire and 
Bleve 
-275 20 8.1 
UVCE -425 20 40.5 
Local Thermal 
Hazard 
-30 5 8 
Safe Dispersal -3 1 9 
 
 
Detailed descriptions of the possible outcomes may be found in (AICHE, 1989), but 
we briefly outline them here.  A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) 
occurs when a pressurized vessel suddenly fails and its contents flash to the atmosphere, 
producing a pressure wave.  If the expanding substance is also flammable, there is the 
additional danger of a flash fire.  An unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE) occurs 
when a drifting cloud of flammable vapor ignites and explodes, producing a shock wave.  
Such a cloud may also ignite but not produce an overpressure wave, thus generating a 
flash fire.  A local thermal hazard will occur if the release burns locally, without flashing 
back into the tank to cause an explosion.  Of course, safe dispersal is the most desirable 
of these undesirable events, but even this outcome has a negative value associated with a 
shutdown of the facility.  (Fang et al., 2004) 
The event tree supplies the possible outcomes and frequencies.  In order to apply the 
VaR analysis, we also need values for these outcomes.  We have done this using a 
damage index that we created, somewhat arbitrarily, for this example. 
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3.1.2.  Point system for event damage 
We perform our valuation based on the following damage index scale: 
 
0-10 points:  minor damage to the local built environment; rare minor injuries 
10-20 points:   significant damage to the local built environment; common minor 
injuries; rare major injuries 
20-30 points:  severe damage to the local built environment; significant damage 
to the surrounding built environment; common minor and major injuries; at least one 
fatality is likely 
30-40 points: severe damage to the local and surrounding built environment; 
significant damage to the natural environment; many minor and major injuries; 
several fatalities 
40-50 points: catastrophic damage to the local and surrounding built 
environment; permanent damage to the natural environment; many minor and major 
injuries; dozens of fatalities (Fang et al., 2004) 
 
Based on this scale and our judgment of the damage potentials of the various 
outcomes, we have assigned damage points to the outcomes, as shown in Table 2.  We 
have also assigned an “uncertainty” to the damage points, which will be used and 
described later (sections 3.1.4-3.1.6); generally, the uncertainties represent underlying 
stochastic processes specific to the events but beyond the desired level of model detail. 
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Table 2.  Revised data for the LPG leak problem 
Incident Damage 
Index 
Uncertainty Frequency (10-
6/yr) 
BLEVE -200 25 2 
Flash fire -150 15 32.4 
Flash Fire and 
Bleve 
-275 20 8.1 
UVCE -425 20 40.5 
Local Thermal 
Hazard 
-30 5 8 
Safe Dispersal -3 1 9 
 
Note that we will report the negative of the point value when referring to the damage 
index, so that negative numbers with higher absolute values indicate worse damage. 
 
3.1.3.  VaR for the case of no uncertainty in event damage 
If there is no uncertainty in the damage associated with any outcome, then the VaR 
curve is actually a discrete frequency mass function as opposed to a continuous 
frequency density function.  This function is shown in the simple bar graph of Fig. 2. 
Each event contributes to the VaR at exactly one value of the damage index, with a 
frequency determined by the event tree.  We do not show the bar for the outcome of zero 
damage, which has a frequency of 0.9999 yr-1 (assuming that our other outcomes cover 
all other possibilities), because it would be well off the scale of the chart.  The 
cumulative frequency mass function is shown in Fig. 3. (Fang et al., 2004) 
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Figure 2. Damage outcome frequencies for the LPG leak (no uncertainty) 
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Figure 3.  Cumulative mass function for the LPG leak (no uncertainty) 
 
In the financial world, the actual “value at risk” is defined as the value that sets some 
probability limit on the VaR frequency function.  For example, say that the value v 
represents a lower limit where 95% of the frequency lies above it.  Then we can state 
that we are 95% certain that we will lose no more than v over the time horizon used to 
construct the frequency curve, or equivalently, “the value at risk is v.”  Based on the data 
in Fig. 3, we may make statements such as the following:  (Fang et al., 2004) 
• We are 99.99% certain that we will suffer no damage from an LPG 
storage tank leak over the next year. 
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• We are 99.995% certain that we will suffer a damage value of no more 
than 30 points from an LPG storage tank leak over the next year. 
• Over a one-year time horizon, to a 99.995% probability level, our value at 
risk from an LPG storage tank leak is 30 points. 
The last two statements are equivalent. 
The main assumptions used to generate Figs. 2 and 3 are that (1) the fault tree 
prediction of 10-4 LPG storage tank failures per year is accurate, (2) the event tree 
captures all possible failure outcomes and their associated probabilities, and (3) a single 
number is sufficient to capture the damage effects of each outcome.  The next few 
sections address the relaxation of the third assumption.  
 
3.1.4.  VaR for the case of uniform uncertainty in event damage 
In reality, many failure outcomes will result in a distribution of possible damage 
effects, due to stochastic variables such as atmospheric conditions or human factors.  To 
capture the random nature of these processes, damage effects are often modeled as 
probabilistic functions instead of single values. (Fang et al., 2004) 
The simplest approach is to assume a uniform distribution of frequency across some 
damage range, for each outcome.  We demonstrate this approach using the numbers 
given in Table 1 for the LPG storage tank scenario.  The uncertainties of the damage 
events in the table are used as upper and lower bounds on the distributions, with the 
frequency being constant between them and zero elsewhere, and the total frequency 
(area under the curve) being equal to the frequency given in the Table 1.  For example, 
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the damage index associated with the “safe dispersal” outcome ranges from 2 to 4, with 
a uniform frequency density of 4.5*10-6 events per year per damage point, yielding a 
total (integrated) frequency of  9.0*10-6 events per year.  Figure 4 shows the resulting 
VaR curve.  With the use of frequency distributions to describe the damage effects, the 
curve becomes a frequency density function, instead of a frequency mass function.  The 
curves for different individual outcomes now overlap in certain regions of damage index 
value and are combined additively in those regions.  This additivity is justified because 
the event tree produces the outcomes as a set of complementary events, in a probabilistic 
sense.  (Fang et al., 2004) 
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Figure 4.  Frequency density function for the LPG leak (uniform uncertainty) 
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The corresponding cumulative curve is shown in Fig. 5.  The effects of the sharp 
discontinuities in frequency that exist at the edges of the uniform distributions are 
evident in the discontinuities of the slope at several locations in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5.  Cumulative distribution function for the LPG leak (uniform uncertainty) 
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3.1.5.  VaR for the case of Gaussian uncertainty in event damage 
In this case, we assume that the damage effects are distributed normally.  The 
uncertainties listed in Table 1 are now assumed to be the standard deviations in the 
Gaussian distributions.  For clarity, the entire point scale for damage (section 3.1.2) has 
been increased by a factor of 10 with new damage scores for each event.  These new 
scores are reflected in Table 2.  As with the uniform distributions, each Gaussian is 
normalized so that the total area under the curve equals the frequency given in Table 2.  
The frequency density function is shown in Fig. 6 and the corresponding cumulative 
function is shown in Fig. 7.  (Fang et al., 2004) 
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Figure 6.  Outcome density function for the LGP leak (Gaussian uncertainty) 
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Figure 7.  Cumulative distribution function for the LPG leak (Gaussian uncertainty) 
 
With the Gaussian curves, both frequency functions are now smoother.  One problem 
with the normal distribution is that it has infinite range, which may have two undesirable 
side effects in the present analysis.  First, all damage events make some contribution 
(albeit small) to the positive side of the value curve, which is not sensible.  Furthermore, 
even minor damage events make some contribution (albeit small) to extreme damage 
values, which is also not sensible.  (Fang et al., 2004) 
 
3.1.6.  VaR for the case of beta uncertainty in event damage 
An obvious fix to the problem mentioned above is to use a frequency function with 
limited range.  For this purpose, we employed the beta distribution, which has both 
lower and upper bounds.  The parameters α and β for the beta distribution were chosen 
to match the averages and standard deviations (uncertainties) given in Table 1. 
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The density function is shown in Fig. 8, while the cumulative function is shown in 
Fig. 9.  In theory, this is probably the best representation of the results, in that the 
individual damage events are bounded appropriately.  In practice, it doesn’t appear to be 
much different from the Gaussian results, on this scale. (Fang et al., 2004) 
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Figure 8.  Frequency density function for the LPG leak (beta uncertainty) 
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Figure 9.  Cumulative distribution function for the LPG leak (beta uncertainty) 
 
 
3.2.  Second Example Problem: Loading of Chlorine Rail Tank Car 
This example problem applies VaR analysis to a problem illustrated in Chapter VIII 
of CPQRA.  The representative outcomes and their frequencies are taken directly from 
that reference.  The damage index used for this example was created by Khan and 
Abbasi (1997a). 
 
3.2.1.  Scenario description 
In this example, we assume that an incident identification analysis has generated a 
set of representative events associated with a chlorine tank car loading facility, and we 
further assume that a combination of historical data and fault tree analysis has been used 
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to estimate their frequency.  The three representative outcomes and their associated 
frequencies are summarized in Table 3.  Another parameter that affects the consequences 
of the incidents is prevailing wind conditions.  We will assume eight possible wind 
directions that are given an equal frequency of occurring.  (Fang et al, 2004) 
 
Table 3.  Data for the chlorine rail car problem 
Chlorine Potential 
Accidents Estimated frequency (yr-1)
Gas 
release(kg/s) Gas release in one hour
Liquid Leak 5.80E-04 2.7 1620 
Vapor Leak 6.60E-04 0.26 156 
Relief valve discharge 3.00E-06 2.4 8640 
 
 
Detailed descriptions of the possible incidents may be found in CCPS, but we briefly 
outline them here.  The main elements of the facility are a storage tank, a rail tank car, 
and associated transfer equipment.  A small leak of liquid chlorine (~ 2 kg/s for 10 min) 
might arise from a defective hose or valve, or an impact to a transfer pipe.  A small 
vapor leak (~ 0.2 kg/s for 20 min) might arise from the same sources.  A large vapor leak 
(~ 2 kg/s for 60 min) might occur due to a lifting of the relief valve under the stress 
caused by an external fire.  In all three cases, the primary concern is the toxic effects of 
the released chlorine; the loading facility is located 100 m west of a residential area 400 
m square, containing a uniformly distributed population of 400 persons. (AICHE, 1989) 
 
3.2.2.  Point scale for damage events 
 We use the Accident Hazard Index (AHI) due to Khan and Abbasi (1997a).  
While their approach provides a means to rank three types of damage, namely thermal, 
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mechanical (blast), and toxic, we will focus on toxic damage for this example problem 
of chlorine release. 
 Khan and Abbasi’s procedure for determining the contribution to the AHI of a 
toxic load involves the following steps.  First, a parameter R is estimated from 
 
 R = q
LC50
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
1/ 3
 (1) 
 
where LC50 is the concentration (kg/m3) of chlorine vapor that is expected to be lethal to 
50% of the exposed population and q is the total quantity (kg) released.  The value of R 
is used as input to a function that produces a dimensionless severity factor X.  If the 
event is completely contained in the process area, this severity factor X is then the AHI.  
If an external effect (such as harm to population areas) is a concern, a population impact 
factor must be integrated with the severity factor X to produce the final AHI.     
 In this example, the direction of the prevailing wind during a release event is an 
extra stochastic factor.  If the wind carries the chlorine vapor into the nearby residential 
area, an impact factor must be included.  We assume that this will happen when the wind 
blows towards the northeast, east, and southeast (a total of 37.5% of the time).  There are 
now two possibilities for the AHI associated with each event, one with the population 
impact factor and one without.  The population impact factor is derived from a special 
formula derived from Khan and Abbasi (1997b); the input parameters are population 
density, which is the number of people (thousands) per square kilometer.  
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3.2.3.  Analysis of scenario 
Since no uncertainty in the hazard index was available, we carried out a simple 
frequency mass function analysis for the VaR plot, as in Section 3.1.3. 
The frequency mass distribution function featuring the three unwanted events (with 
and without the population damage input) is shown in Fig. 10.  The relief valve 
discharge had the highest hazard index, followed by the vapor and liquid leaks.  The 
vapor indices had the greatest frequency.  However, the wind did not affect the vapor 
leak’s AHI, because the rate of gas release (~0.2 kg/s) was too small to be a hazard to a 
residential population 100 meters away.  The resulting frequency mass function plot is 
shown below in figure 10.  The cumulative mass density plot is shown in Fig. 11. 
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Figure 10.  Frequency mass function for the chlorine rail car problem 
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Figure 11.  Cumulative distribution function for the chlorine rail car problem 
 
 
The following VaR statements may be made from the data: 
 
• Over a one-year time horizon, to a 99.9% probability level, our value at risk from 
toxic leaks at the tank car facility is 2.82 on the AHI. 
• Over a one-year time horizon, to a 99.99% probability level, our value at risk 
from toxic leaks at the tank car facility is 5.89 on the AHI. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LAYERS OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS EXAMPLE 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous section, we demonstrated the application of VaR to two process 
safety case studies; event trees for potential incidents with chlorine rail transport and 
propane gas storage were used to generate VaR loss probability functions and assess 
risk.  In this chapter we demonstrate the application of VaR to an ethylene compressor 
using the Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) as it applies to process safety.   
 
4.1.1 Process description and potential failures 
The main focus of our analysis is an individual ethylene gas refrigeration compressor 
with a capacity of processing millions of pounds of material per day.  Such a device 
would be found in a liquefied natural gas processing complex, condensing light 
hydrocarbons for storage and transportation.  The compressor, like any piece of 
equipment, is subject to failures of varying type and severity.  We will consider six 
different types of failure, namely failures associated with surge control, high suction 
drum level process demand, lube oil control, seal oil control, speed suction control, and 
vibration process demand.  Most of these failure types, if unchecked, would result in 
approximately one million dollars of equipment damage plus the loss of production from 
being shut down for about 7 days.  The exception is a seal oil control failure, which 
would incur a 30-day loss of production.  To prevent these high levels of damage, one 
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may install safety interlocks that shut down, or “trip,” the compressor in response to an 
undesirable event.  These shutdowns typically cause the compressor to be down for one 
business day, significantly limiting the loss.  However, one drawback of the interlocks is 
that they occasionally have spurious trips that shut down the compressor when there is 
no true process fault; this causes unnecessary loss in production.  Details of the interlock 
implementation are described in the next section. 
 
4.1.2 Layers of protection 
SIS-Tech (2004) has performed a QRA on a set of safety interlocks for the ethylene 
refrigeration compressor as described above.  The interlocks are layered in series so that 
if the first interlock does not successfully shut down the system, the second can shut it 
down, and so on.  The QRA is represented as a set of event trees, each modeling the 
response of the safety system to one of the failure events described in the previous 
section.  Each interlock and event tree is considered to be independent of the others.  
Figure 12 shows the generic event tree structure.  The top event (failure) occurs with an 
estimated frequency.  Each of the safety interlocks provides a success/failure node; there 
is a certain probability (x) that the interlock will successfully trip the compressor and a 
complementary probability (1-x) that it will not trip.  The upward branch represents a 
successful trip and ends with a shutdown; the downward branch represents a failure to 
trip and leads to either a subsequent interlock or ultimate compressor failure (if it is the 
last layer).  The appropriate branch probabilities are multiplied by the top event 
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frequency to yield the frequencies of a given sub-event (a successful shutdown or an 
ultimate compressor failure). 
While we consider six types of failure events, there are multiple surge controllers, so 
there are actually eight distinct top events: (1) 1st SG surge control failure, (2) 2nd/3rd SG 
surge control failure, (3) 4th/5th SG surge control failure, (4) high suction drum level 
process demand failure, (5) lube oil control system failure, (6) LC01 seal oil control 
failure, (7) speed suction control failure, and (8) vibration process demand failure.  Each 
of the eight top events was given a frequency determined from historical data. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the eight top events and their sub-events, 
corresponding to the response of the safety devices in the different layers of protection.  
The first column of Table 4 lists the events and sub-events.  The second column provides 
the cost associated with each individual sub-event outcome.  The third column provides 
the frequency associated with each top and sub-event, for the base case of full layers of 
protection (all devices in place).  Subsequent columns represent the same information, 
but for perturbations of the base case (called “scenarios”) where one layer of protection 
has been removed.  The cost data for each sub-event is not scenario-dependent, so it 
appears in only one column.  The frequencies and costs for a top event and its sub-events 
can be mapped directly onto an event tree like that shown in Fig. 12. 
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Figure 12: General form of event tree 
 
Spurious trips of these safety devices are summarized at the bottom of Table 4, with 
the considered possible trips being (1) Overspeed 1, (2) Overspeed 2, (3) Vibration, (4) 
KO drum level 1-5, (5) lube oil pressure, and (6) SO level.  Each of these spurious trips 
may be considered as an independent, individual sub-event for the purposes of the 
following discussion. 
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Table 4.  Frequencies and cost data for all the events and cases 
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4.2. Theory and Methods 
 
4.2.1. Calculations of frequencies and cost values 
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the sub-event frequencies in Table 4 were obtained 
from an event tree like that shown in Fig. 12.  The frequency of sub-event i is given by  
 
  (2) fi = Ftop p j
j=1
i∏
 
where Ftop is the top event frequency and pj is the appropriate conditional branch 
probability at node j.  The pj were obtained from historical performance data. 
For clarity, we briefly describe an example of our frequency calculations for the case 
of SG surge control failure (top event 1) in the scenario without Overspeed interlock 1 
(fourth column in Table 4).  The top event frequency was assigned a value of 0.16 yr-1 
based on historical data.  Since Overspeed interlock 1 is absent in this scenario, the 
probability of its success is 0 and therefore the frequency of its success is (0.16 yr-1 
)*(0.0) = 0.0 yr-1.  Overspeed interlock 2 is present in this scenario and we assign the 
probability of its successful response on demand as 0.9769 based on historical data.  The 
frequency for Overspeed interlock 2 success is the product of this probability and the 
demand frequency under this scenario, i.e. (0.16 yr-1)*(1.0-0.0)*(0.9769) = .0156 yr-1.  
The final layer of protection is the vibration interlock, to which we assign a success 
probability of 0.9760 on demand.  The frequency for successful vibration interlock 
 31
intervention is therefore (0.16 yr-1)*(1.0-0.0)*(1-0.9769)*(0.9760) =  0.00364 yr-1, and 
the frequency of failed vibration interlock intervention is (0.16 yr-1)*(1.0-0.0)*(1-
0.9769)*(1-0.9760) =  0.0000896 yr-1.  These calculations produce the numerical values 
found in Table 1.  We note that the top event frequency Ftop and the probability of 
success on demand for a given interlock type is held fixed across the different scenarios; 
it is the presence or absence of a given layer of protection that causes the differences in 
frequencies observed in Table 4.  
Each of the sub-event outcomes has an associated cost.  We assume that the cost may 
comprise both asset damage and business interruption.  Business interruption may 
include both lost (flared) feed and product that was not made.  We assume that two hours 
of feed flaring occurs at every shutdown and that the feed costs $0.20/pound.  We also 
assume that the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
is $0.05/pound of product.  A one-day shutdown from any safety interlock trip will then 
cost roughly 
 
000,700,2$
lb
05.0$
day
lb MM 4day 1
lb
20.0$
day
lb MM 4day
24
2
trip =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ××+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ××=c  (3) 
 
For most events in which all interlocks fail, there will be approximately $1MM in 
damage to the compressor plus a seven day shutdown of the process.  The cost will be 
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  (4) 
In the special case of the failure of the seal oil control with subsequent failure of all 
interlocks, the downtime will be 30 days, leading to a cost of 
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  (5) 
 
So in this particular QRA example there are only three different possible cost 
outcomes, c = $270,000, $2,500,000, or $7,100,000.  One of these costs is assigned to 
each sub-event as shown in Table 4, and that cost is independent of scenario. 
 
4.2.2.  Generation of frequency-cost graphs and VaR statistics 
For a given scenario, the total frequency Fc at a given cost outcome c was obtained 
by summing up all of the frequencies as 
 
  (6) Fc = fi
sub-events i{ }c
∑
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where the sum includes only those sub-events that have the particular cost outcome c 
(spurious trips included).  This was done for each different scenario shown in Table 4 
and the results are presented as bar graphs in Section 4.3.  These graphs are similar to 
probability mass function (pmf) graphs in statistics, except that we are plotting 
frequency (in yr-1) instead of normalized probability. 
In this chapter we determine VaR in a more real life method as opposed to the 
previous theoretical methods in the previous chapters.  In financial applications, the 
actual “value at risk” is defined as the value that sets some lower probability limit on the 
normalized probability-value function.  For example, say that the value v represents a 
lower limit (typically negative, indicating a loss) where pv of the probability lies above 
it.  Then we can state that we are (pv x 100)% certain that we will lose no more than v 
over the time horizon used to construct the probability curve, or equivalently, with (pv x 
100)% certainty over the next time period t, the VaR is v (Jorion, 2001) .  A cumulative 
representation of the probability curve is particularly useful in determining VaR, since 
one may simply read off the abscissa value v corresponding to the ordinate at the chosen 
probability level pv.  In the present case we have only three discrete cost values, so it is 
more convenient to choose the median cost value and report the corresponding 
probability level. 
As a first step in calculating VaR, we must convert our event frequencies Fc to 
normalized probabilities over a chosen time horizon.  Perhaps the simplest approach is to 
assume that failure events are uncorrelated in time over a given horizon.  This 
assumption is likely to be accurate in our case, because the overarching QRA analysis 
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assumes that failures arise from a variety of independent event types and sub-types (as 
shown in Table 4).  So we employ a Poisson distribution of events with a one-year time 
horizon 
Since we have a finite number of distinct events and costs, then the Poisson process 
assumption implies that the subprocesses dealing with the individual scenarios are 
independent Poisson processes.  Specifically, assume there are k costs associated with 
frequencies f1, f2… fK normalized to sum to 1.  Then the number of events with cost cj in 
a time period of length T is a poisson with mean fcTλ and is an independent set of events 
with different costs.  The chance of at least one event with cost cc in a time period of 
length is shown in equation 9.  
 
  (9) λTfc cep −= 1
 
where T is equal to the time horizon, in our case one year, and λ is the rate of events in 
units of yr-1. These probabilities can be used to construct the cumulative mass functions 
(cmf) and subsequently calculate VaR values, as described above. 
 
4.2.3.  Total expected cost value 
A total expected cost value for each scenario was calculated as 
 
  λTfcE CC=  (10) 
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where the sum runs over all possible cost outcomes c (in our example, there are three 
outcomes). 
 
4.3.  Results 
 
4.3.1. Overview 
Results for the four scenarios shown in Table 1 are presented and discussed in this 
section.  The scenarios are the base case (full layers of protection), overspeed interlock 1 
removed, overspeed interlock 2 removed, and the vibrational interlock removed.  The 
different scenarios are presented side-by-side in the figures for convenient comparison.  
The frequency versus cost graphs are shown in Fig. 13, the cumulative mass function 
(cmf) graphs (as calculated via the procedure described in section 4.2.2) are shown in 
Fig. 13a, and the total expected values (section 4.2.3) are shown in Fig. 14a.  The (b,c) 
figures associated with Figs. 13 and 14 are magnifications of the low-frequency, high-
cost events, which can be difficult to see.  The results of all the function studies are 
summarized in Table 5.   
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Figure 13a.  Outcome frequencies at all cost levels across all scenarios 
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Figure 13b.  Close-up view of outcome frequencies at the $2,500,000 cost level 
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Figure 13c.  Close-up view of outcome frequencies at the $7,100,000 cost level 
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Figure 14a. Cumulative mass probability functions for each scenario 
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Figure 14b.  Close-up view of the cumulative mass functions at the $2,500,000 cost 
level 
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Figure 14c. Close-up view of the cumulative mass functions at the $7,100,000 cost 
level 
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Table 5. Frequency and cumulative probability data for all of the scenarios 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2.  Base case 
The base case represents full layers or protection, meaning the compressor is 
equipped with Overspeed interlock 1, Overspeed interlock 2, and Vibrational interlock.  
The base case data in Fig. 13a may be used to make several statements.  For example, a 
catastrophic event costing the company $7,100,000 will happen with a frequency of 
0.002259 per year (which equates to ~440 years per loss of this magnitude), and a 
shutdown at the least costly level of $266,667 will happen with a frequency of 1.066 per 
year.  Value-at-risk statements can also be made from the corresponding cumulative 
probabilities shown in Fig. 14a.  For example, over a one-year time horizon, we are 
99.9994% confident that there will be no worse than a $270,000 loss. 
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4.3.3.  Case without overspeed interlock 1 
In this case, we examine the impact of removing overspeed interlock 1 layer of 
protection.  As shown in Table 4, we removed the benefits of overspeed interlock 1 from 
all top events and removed the possibility of spurious trips of that device.  Removal of 
this layer of protection affected five of the eight top events. 
Figure 14a shows that removing overspeed interlock 1 involves a tradeoff between 
risk at different cost levels.  Removing this interlock reduces the frequency of $270,000 
cost events to 1.022 yr-1, as compared to 1.066 yr-1 in the base case.  However, for the 
medium ($2,500,000) cost category the frequency is increased by 0.0031 yr-1.  With this 
tradeoff comes less satisfying VaR values as compared to the base case; there is only a 
99.9969% probability level that the cost will be no worse than $270,000.  This analysis 
clearly frames the impact of including, or omitting, Overspeed interlock 1 layer of 
protection. 
 
4.3.4.  Case without overspeed interlock 2 
In this scenario, we removed a different layer of protection, Overspeed interlock 2 
(Overspeed 1 layer remained in place).  Using the same procedure as in the previous 
scenario, we altered the frequencies of sub-events and spurious trips accordingly (see 
Table 4).  The removal of this interlock affected the same 5 out of 8 top events that first 
scenario did.  
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Figures 13b and 14b show that the effects of removing overspeed interlock 2 are 
almost identical to the effects of removing overspeed  interlock 1.  The VaR value is 
99.9969% at the $270,000 mark. This is perhaps not surprising because the Overspeed 
interlock 1 and Overspeed interlock 2 always appeared in series under the same top 
events. 
 
4.3.5.  Case without the vibrational interlock 
In this scenario we removed the vibration interlock, a layer of protection that does 
not always follow in series with the two aforementioned layers of protection.  This 
particular layer of protection affects six of the eight top events. 
Removing the vibrational interlock is much more detrimental to the entire safety 
plan.  Although there is a significant 0.1735 yr-1 decrease in frequency at the low 
($270,000) level, there is a two order-of-magnitude increase in frequency in the medium 
($2,500,000) level.  There is a 98.95% probability level that the cost will be no greater 
than $270,000, which is a much lower probability than any of the previous cases. 
 
4.3.6. Total expected value for damage cost 
The total expected loss value for each scenario is shown in Fig. 15; this is a 
simplified approach where the low probability/high cost – high probability/low cost 
tradeoffs are not thoroughly examined, but rather all costs are integrated to produce a 
single expectation value for each scenario.  In order of increasing expected cost, the 
scenario without Vibrational interlock is the least costly followed by overspeed interlock 
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2, the scenario without overspeed interlock 1 the base case.  As ranked solely by this 
criterion, the base case scenario is the least costly.  The scenario without the vibrational 
interlock is the most desirable.  There is an interesting contrast between this ranking and 
one based on the VaR criterion, which would show that the base case is the most 
desirable.  This is discussed more fully in the next subsection. 
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Figure 15.  Total expected cost values for the four scenarios 
 
 
 
 
4.3.7. Best choice among the four scenarios? 
The numerical results of the analysis are summarized in Table 5.  The total expected 
cost analysis and the VaR analysis (CMFs) have contrasting messages.  The total 
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expected cost favors the scenario without the vibrational interlock over the other three 
scenarios but  the VaR analysis favors the base case over the other three scenarios.  The 
two scenarios without the overspeed interlocks were both medians in both analyses.  The 
total expected cost analysis showed that the vibrational interlock 
The difference in conclusions occurs because the VaR probability criterion places 
more weight on the higher cost levels, while the expected value criterion is based on a 
straight average.  Clearly, one effect of altering the layers of protection scheme is to shift 
the probability between different cost levels. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
 
We discussed how VaR concepts from finance might be used to make a better 
business case for process safety in the CPI.  We demonstrated the procedure on two 
example problems from the CPQRA literature, creating VaR curves based on valuation 
with different damage/hazard indices (literature-based and customized).  The effects of 
uncertainty in damage associated with possible events were included.  In addition, we 
applied a VaR analysis to the ethylene refrigeration compressor system safety data 
provided to us by SIS-Tech (2004).  We analyzed the data with all layers of protection 
included (based case) and in three different scenarios in which one type of interlock was 
removed.  We found that the full layers of protection scheme was conservative, with low 
frequencies of occurrence for the most costly events but relatively frequent low-cost 
incidents (spurious trips).  Removing the Overspeed 1 and Overspeed 2 interlock 
lowered the frequency of minor spurious shutdowns but raised the chances, albeit 
slightly, of a more severe event while the vibrational interlock raised the frequency.  The 
expected value of the costs integrated both the conservative and aggressive schemes.    
But the VaR tool could give comprehensive approach to which scenario was riskier. 
The future work involves using programming software to automate this process of 
selecting which safety interlocks to use and which safety devices would be worth the 
cost.  Human factors and reliability could also be utilized in this context of valuating 
process safety.   
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 Finally, cost benefit and analysis is imperative for decision makers to 
comprehend the results from risk analysis tools correctly and efficiently and interpret 
them to informed decisions for the wealth of their enterprise.   
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